

Inducement Prizes and Innovation

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Abstract

We examine the effect of prizes on innovation using data on awards for technological development offered by the Royal Agricultural Society of England at annual competitions between 1839 and 1939. We find large effects of the prizes on competitive entry and the quality of contemporaneous patents, especially when prize categories were set by a strict rotation scheme, thereby mitigating the potentially confounding effect that they targeted only “hot” technology sectors. The prizes encouraged competition and medals were particularly effective. The boost to innovation we observe can only be partly explained by the re-direction of existing inventive activity.

JEL: O31, O30, N40

Keywords: Awards, Patents, Contests

1. Introduction

A long-standing argument in the literature on incentives for innovation suggests that prize awards can be a powerful mechanism for accelerating technological development (e.g., Polanyi, 1944; Wright, 1983; Kremer, 1998; Shavell and Ypersele, 2001; Scotchmer, 2004; Boldrin and Levine, 2008; Kremer and Williams, 2009; Chari et al., 2009). Although this literature highlights that the welfare effects of targeted technologies are difficult to estimate *ex ante*, there has been a recent resurgence in the use of prizes for spurring innovation in areas considered to be socially and economically important. Most notably the X-Prize Foundation awarded a \$10 million prize for suborbital spaceflight in 2004, followed by a \$10 million prize for rapid human genome sequencing, the \$30 million Google moon challenge, and inducements for clean-tech and medical related solutions. NASA has sponsored prizes for technological innovation since 2004 and several other governmental prize challenges, or advance market commitments, have been announced (Kalil, 2006). A pioneering venture fund, Prize Capital, has sought to use contests to generate investment opportunities. A recent report by the National Research Council (2007) urged the National Science Foundation to begin an inducement prize program.

The economic theory of prizes rests on limited historical case studies. For example, Kremer (1998) cites the 1839 decision by the French government to purchase the Daguerreotype photography patent as evidence that patent buyouts can work. A 1714 prize offered by the British government for an instrument measuring longitude is frequently referenced to highlight the benefits and pitfalls of a reward system. The substantial prize of £20,000 offered under a special Act of Parliament encouraged competition and technological development. However, John Harrison, who solved the navigational problem, had to wait until 1773 for his prize to be fully paid up following an acrimonious dispute over the conditions of the award (Sobel, 1996). Individual case studies, while illuminating, leave open the question of whether prizes can be used more systematically to stimulate innovation. The National Research Council lamented that, “owing to the limited experience with innovation prizes, relatively little is known about how they work in practice or how effective they may be” (2007, p. 11).

We address this gap in our understanding using a unique data set of prizes awarded for inventiveness by the Royal Agricultural Society of England (hereafter RASE) between 1839 and 1939. Founded in 1838 to stimulate agricultural progress through “practice with science,” and obtaining a Royal Charter of Incorporation in 1840, the RASE became one of England’s most

influential scientific societies. A founding objective was “by the distribution of prizes and any other mode of expending a part of the resources of the Society, to encourage men of science to exert themselves in the improvement of agricultural implements” (Goddard, 1988, p. 26). From 1839, the RASE held prize competitions at each of its annual national shows. It awarded both substantial monetary prizes (totaling in excess of £1 million in current prices) and its own highly prestigious medals for innovative implements and machinery. Between 1839 and 1939, 15,032 entrant inventions competed for the prizes and a total of 1,986 awards were made.¹

From the records of the RASE, we compiled details on all the entrants and prize winners. We collected as well the prize schedules for all available show years. Each year the RASE decided which technological areas it wanted to target and the number and value of prizes to be awarded. This schedule of prizes was announced *ex ante*, one year before each show. The RASE was also aware that important innovations might come along entirely unexpectedly and the judges were therefore given discretion to award additional *ex post* prizes. Some types of agricultural machinery were more in need of improvement, so the RASE targeted those areas by offering more and higher-valued prizes. Competitions were practical and the inventions entered were assessed scientifically by RASE engineers. For example, harvesting machines were tested on a local, working farm. Judges authorized the payment of awards.

Prizes and patents may simultaneously generate incentives for innovation (Wright, 1983; Shavell and Ypersele, 2001). Because inventors could pursue both patents and prizes, we assembled a data set of all British patents from 1839 to 1939 and matched these against our entrants, prize winners and prize schedules. We complemented existing databases of patents with our own data collected from records of the British Patent Office. Thus, we were able to identify all granted patents during the period 1839-1939.² We also identified patents for which renewal fees were paid to quality-adjust our patent counts. Renewal fees provide an indicator of patent quality on the assumption that renewed patents have a higher value than those that were allowed to lapse (e.g., Schankerman and Pakes, 1986; Lanjouw, Pakes, and Putnam, 1996). This enhances our ability to measure inventive output accurately.

¹ The prize competitions restarted after World War II, and indeed are still running today, but only on a much more restricted scale than previously. Hence we confine our analysis to the 1839-1939 period, when the prize competitions constituted a more prominent part of the activities of the RASE.

² British patents were officially sealed as opposed to being “granted,” but we use the latter term for convenience.

Our empirical strategy for identifying whether, and how, these prizes affected innovation proceeds in three stages. First, we examine entrants for the prizes. One metric of a prize program's impact is the number of contestants that it attracts (NRC, 2007, p.39). Although entry is not synonymous with innovation, if prizes encourage competition and more intensive effort on technological development, this provides one mechanism through which a boost to innovation can occur. The RASE used money and medal prizes as inducements, so we examine the contribution of each to the level of entry. We estimate that the largest entrant effect from the RASE gold medal, 16 of which were announced and 13 awarded in the years covered by our data set. Spurious entries were discouraged using entry fees for non-members of the Society, which were refunded if the entry were judged to be genuinely novel (whether or not the machine actually worked or won a prize). The shows attracted a considerable degree of interest and the machinery could be inspected by the public, thereby enhancing the diffusion of technological knowledge. Between 1853 and 1939 the shows drew almost 9 million attendees, with the single most popular show being Manchester in 1897, which attracted 217,980 visitors.

Second, we examine whether the prizes provided a boost to innovation. We determine which inventions exhibited at the shows were patented and when the patent application occurred. Our objective is to test for identifying variance in the data with respect to output effects so that we can estimate the impact of prize awards on aggregate innovation. We find that around a fifth of the 15,032 entrant inventions were patented, which corresponds closely to the proportion of "mechanical" technologies patented at the Crystal Palace Exhibition in 1851 (Moser, 2005). Crucially, we find that the largest spike in patenting for inventors occurred in the year of the show (i.e., approximately a year after the prizes were announced), suggesting that the relationship between prizes and patenting was quite immediate. We use this finding on the timing of patenting to identify the effects of prizes on technological development. If prizes spur innovation, then we should observe an effect of prize awards on aggregate contemporaneous patenting activity. The English rubric for recording patents – on the basis of their application date – links the timing of patents very closely to the timing of inventions and thus gives temporal precision to our measurement (see for a further discussion Appendix one). Organizing the patents and prizes into technology categories, we focus on within-category variation in patent counts conditional on the award of prizes. We detect statistically significant effects of monetary and

medal awards, especially in patent renewal fee specifications that parse out lower quality patents. We show that medal awards had the economically largest effect on aggregate patenting activity.

Since both our entrant and patent results could be driven by the assignment of prizes to “hot” technology sectors, we exploit a prize rotation system used by the RASE between 1856 and 1872 to mitigate any bias. Following the success of the early shows and the growing number of entrants for prizes, the RASE spread trials for different categories of farm implements over a number of years. In 1855 a triennial system was established in the schedule, which rotated prize awards between implements for tillage and drainage; machines for the cultivation and harvesting of crops; and machines for preparing crops for market and food for cattle. An attractive feature of these rotating *ex ante* prizes econometrically is that they are not driven by any demand or supply shocks to innovation because they were announced independently of any cycles of invention (Scott Watson, 1939, p.94; Goddard, 1988, p.55). That is, it is improbable that the rhythm of invention cycles between 1856 and 1872 happened to match the rhythm of the prize rotation scheme laid down in 1855.³ We find that our results are robust to the years when the rotation system operated. In fact, we find even larger effects of monetary prizes and a gold medal in our entrant and patent regressions during these years, which suggests that giving longer lead times to inventors raised the number of competition entries and the intensity of innovation.

Third, we analyze the extent to which the boost to innovation that we observe can be explained by the re-direction of existing inventive activity. Prizes can lead to an increase in aggregate innovative output, or simply incentivize inventors to substitute from one technology category to another. This latter effect may have been particularly strong during the rotation period when inventors had some advance warning of the technology category that prizes would be announced in. Our sample of entrants, prize winners and patentees is large enough that we can observe repeat inventors and the frequency of their cross-technology category substitution. We show that the odds of switching, conditional upon a medal prize being announced in the schedule, were economically important for entrants and prize winners, but not for inventors who did not enter into the RASE competitions but who did patent in agricultural related areas. When we exclude inventors that would have been more likely to engage in cross-technology category

³ Towards the end of the period of rotating prizes the *Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society of England* lamented exactly this fact and the rotation system was subsequently abandoned. A general report on the exhibition of implements in the JRASE noted in 1868: “Because it is not their special year of the trial, it is no valid reason why a Society like ours should wait for probably two years before it announces improvement[s] to the public. The Society ought rather to be on the ‘look out’ for advanced movements and should be first to herald them forth (p.461).”

substitution from our patent renewal regressions in the prize rotation period, we still detect statistically and economically significant effects of monetary and gold medal prizes on patenting. While the prizes affected the direction of inventive effort, this does not explain all of the increase in the level of innovation that we observe.

Taken together, our results suggest that prizes can be an important inducement for innovation. The contests organized by the RASE attracted large numbers of inventors and the competitions as public events encouraged the diffusion of useful knowledge across innovators. Competitive entry is associated with patenting activity in the priority areas with an especially large effect of the prizes on the quality of technological invention. While the monetary awards did not offset all the costs of technological development (we show that they covered on average only around one-third of the sale price of a single unit of an implement or machine exhibited by a successful entrant) winning a prize conferred additional intangible benefits, or a certification effect. Inventors were bestowed with “the Society’s mark of approval,” which was a powerful form of advertising (Jenkins, 1878, p.870). Although the shows were costly to organize, our evidence suggests they were associated with significant aggregate innovation effects.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we sketch out the historical background to the RASE prize system. Section three describes the construction of our data set. Section four outlines the main empirical specifications and section five presents the results. Section six examines the re-direction of inventive activity through repeat entrants into the competitions and patentees. Section seven concludes with some caveats to our analysis and a discussion of how our findings can inform the design of current inducement prize contests.

2. Scientific Societies, Prizes and Patents

Debate surrounds the role of learned societies in the accumulation of scientific and technological knowledge. In Britain alone, by 1850 there were 1,020 scientific societies or associations with approximately 200,000 members (Mokyr, 2002, pp. 43-45, 66). Yet, the link between these scientific institutions and the progress of innovation may not have been causal. Lerner (1992) argues in his analysis of agricultural progress between 1660 and 1780 that causality ran the other way. The scientific experiments of the Royal Society (founded in 1660) and the Society of Arts (founded in 1754) were infrequent and haphazard in areas related to agriculture, while few Royal Society members engaged in agricultural patenting.

The RASE was able to learn from its antecedent institutions. Whereas its predecessors were distracted by politics, which hampered their ability to focus on the technical and scientific aspects of innovation, the RASE was a politically agnostic organization. In offering prizes for inventiveness, the RASE followed the Society of Arts, which also awarded premiums for radical agricultural improvements.⁴ However, the RASE moved beyond the Society of Arts by designing a prize system that was more conducive to the dissemination of agricultural science, principally through the use of the rigorous competitions.⁵ The founding members of the RASE considered that agricultural productivity needed to be stimulated at a time when industrial growth was at an all time high (Scott Watson, 1939; Goddard, 1988, p. 26).⁶

Although the prize award system was modified over time, it maintained a common structure. After the first few shows a schedule of prizes was set up each year and announced to the public one year in advance of the annual show. Farmers and the public attached a growing significance to the prizes and by the mid-1850s the number of entrants exceeded the limit of what the RASE could subject to a technical trial. Consequently, a triennial rotation system was introduced.⁷ This allowed the RASE to focus its efforts on a scientific assessment of technologies in a single category each year and it gave innovators longer lead times.⁸ The downside of rotation was that it treated different kinds of innovation in a largely equal manner. By the 1870s, the RASE reported that technological development in certain categories had reached a plateau, which it partly attributed to the system of rotating prizes. Strict rotation was abandoned in favor of targeting technology areas (Scott Watson, 1939; Goddard, 1988).

The RASE altered the value of the prizes within technology categories to spur innovation and change the direction of technological development. For example, after awarding an *ex post* prize of a gold medal at the Crystal Palace Exhibition to the American, Cyrus McCormick, for his reaping machinery, the RASE offered a series of prizes for cumulative improvements in harvesting technology to address the problem that American reapers were far superior to their English counterparts. A representative of the RASE was sent to the Philadelphia Exhibition of

⁴ Between 1754 and 1776, £3,248 in bounties and premia were paid out by the Society of Arts (Lerner, 1992, p. 26).

⁵ The RASE offered prizes also for livestock, with in excess of 190,000 entries at the shows between 1839 and 1939.

⁶ While growth in industry and agriculture were both flatter than was once believed (Crafts, 1985; Clark, 2002; Antràs and Voth, 2003), this does not detract from the key innovations that the RASE sought to advance.

⁷ Rotating prizes began with implements for tillage and drainage, then machines for the cultivation and harvesting of crops in the following year, and then machines for preparing crops for market and food for cattle in a third year.

⁸ We would therefore expect the response of innovators to prizes to be more marked in the period in which the rotation scheme was in operation.

1876 and noted that McCormick's harvesting machines had advanced to the point where cut corn could be automatically bound. Subsequent competitions were announced by the RASE in an effort to improve reapers and close the transatlantic technology gap (see also David, 1971).⁹

The trials that the RASE organized were elaborate and stringent. Judges and consulting engineers set up tests that were scientifically evaluated. Reaping machines were tested on farms during the summer harvest to see how effectively they could work with British crops. At horse plow trials, a dynamometer – an instrument invented by the RASE consulting engineer expressly for the competition – was used to test the amount of draft required to pull each of the plows, as well as timings being taken to see how long it took the plow team to work a certain area of land. In 1856, the Society offered a substantial prize of £500 for “the steam cultivator which shall in the most efficient manner turn over the soil and be an economical substitute for the plough or the spade”. These machines were judged against the time and labor it would take to plow an area with a horse. At a traction engine trial in 1871 a 3,168 yard course was set out with rough and uneven terrain with “ugly dips and circuitous lines to render the competition as severe as possible”. Trials were expensive to operate. In 1878 it was estimated that the trials cost £2,000 per annum (Jenkins, 1878, p. 871-872), while in 1920 the tractor trials alone cost the Society almost £5,000 (Scott Watson, 1939, p. 102).¹⁰ Following each set of trials, the judges wrote up a detailed report on the inventions in the *Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society of England*.

From 1847 onwards, the trials were closed affairs that were opened to the public only after the judges had completed their evaluations. This made monitoring easier and prevented chicanery. A further feature of the trials was that inventors were given the opportunity to inspect the machines of larger manufacturers in the hope of encouraging technological spillovers, as well as licensing or royalty agreements for the use of inventions that had been patented (Scott Watson, 1939, p. 85). Losing intellectual property rights as a result of exhibiting unpatented inventions at the shows was assuaged by the Protection of Inventions Act of 1851, which was passed in response to the Great Exhibition at Crystal Palace. Inventors could display at

⁹ The RASE reacted with the offer of a gold medal at Liverpool in 1877 for a sheaf-binding machine. The judges concluded after a field trial that the prize should be withheld because none of the machines was sufficiently effective to warrant the award, including the McCormick entry. So the competition remained open until 1878, when the gold medal was awarded at the Bristol show to an improved McCormick machine (Scott Watson, 1939, pp. 84-96).

¹⁰ In fact, the cost of the trials was a very considerable burden on the finances of the RASE, whose only sources of income were the annual subscriptions paid by its members and the gate money arising from the annual show. Cost was a major reason that the number of competitions had to be scaled back in later years.

exhibitions without invalidating their patenting claim to novelty (Van Dulken, 1999, p.21).¹¹ Also, inventors were permitted to enter into competition innovations that had already been patented or had a patent application pending.

The prize awards were not designed to be a substitute for patenting, although they did act as an antidote to some of the British patent system's more negative effects.¹² British patent fees were the highest in the world. By the middle of the nineteenth century, rolling in extraneous expenses, a patent could cost £120 in England and as much as £350 in Scotland and Ireland (Macleod, 1988, p.76). While initial fees were progressively reduced by Acts of Parliament (in particular in 1883, when they were set at just 16 percent of their 1852 level), in 1925, it was still ten times more expensive to carry a patent to full term in Britain than in the United States (Lerner, 2002). The Society's prizes, on the other hand, were open to all. Prizes were awarded meritocratically, as established manufacturers complained about entry by newcomers (Goddard, 1988, p.109). For example, in 1855 dissenting manufacturers authored a report stating: "We object to this system [of prizes] on the ground that it operates as an undue stimulus to competition."¹³ In 1856 one manufacturer commented on the apparent "destructive" side of the prize competitions: "It is unfair because... there will always be sure to be somebody trying to find out some improvement or other and there is no knowing where will be the end to it."¹⁴

3. The Data

Although the topic of prizes was debated by the Royal Society of Arts in 1856 and 1862, the RASE never analyzed the effectiveness of the prize system. While some commentators at RSA debates argued that it was difficult to establish a causal link between inducement prizes and innovation, citing additionally the case of the Crystal Palace Exhibition, many participants in the discussion were more optimistic about their influence (Hoskyns, 1856; Sidney, 1862). J.A. Ransome, a leading implement manufacturer, argued that the prizes "enabled the makers of implements in every district to profit by the examples of the best implements... [which] have

¹¹ This was a crucial piece of legislation. In a well-known historical case, James Hargreaves, the inventor of the spinning jenny, was denied patent rights by the courts in 1785 because he had sold jennies before applying for his patent. Two conditions needed to be met for the law to protect unpatented inventions exhibited at shows: the exhibitor had to inform the comptroller of patents of his/her intention to exhibit and the application for a patent on the exhibited invention had to be made within six months of the show date.

¹² Khan (2005) argues that the expense of obtaining a patent in Britain undermined democratic invention by removing intellectual property rights from all but the economic elite.

¹³ *Newton's London Journal of Arts and Sciences*, August 1, 1860, p.66.

¹⁴ *British Farmer's Magazine* vol. 24., 1856, p.205.

become more generally diffused” (Hoskyns, 1856, p. 284). In the remainder of this paper we undertake the first quantitative study of the prize system, using data on prizes and patents.

3.1 Entrants, Winners and the Prize Schedule

We collected three data series from the records of the RASE: those who entered machinery or implements into a competition; those who were awarded prizes in a competition; and the prize schedule for competitions that was announced by the RASE one year prior to each show. Entrant information was taken from the RASE exhibition catalogues, where a typical observation would give the name of the entrant, a description of the technology being exhibited and the stand number where the inventor was located at the show.¹⁵ Prize winners were announced at the shows and were also listed in the main publication of the RASE, the *Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society of England*. The prize winner was named along with their implement, or machine, as well as the monetary value of the prize amount, or medal awarded.¹⁶

In the same publication, the prize schedule was announced. The rubric of the prize schedule states the conditions of the awards: “The prizes are open to general competition; Members having the privilege of a free entry; while non-subscribers are allowed to compete on the payment of a fee of 5s. on each certificate”. Entrants applied for certificates by writing to RASE headquarters in Hanover Square, London. The prizes were listed underneath these instructions.¹⁷ The RASE generally funded the awards itself, although in some cases individual donors did so.¹⁸

We collected data on each of the 98 shows between 1839 and 1939 (there was no show in 1866 due to cattle plague or in 1917 or 1918 due to the First World War), compiling information on 15,032 entrant inventions and a total of 1,986 award-winning inventions. Due to missing prize schedules for certain years, we were able to match up 91 years of entrants, winners and prizes offered.¹⁹ In order to facilitate a comparison of the entrants, winners and awards over time, we

¹⁵ For example, a listing from 1844 reads: “Stand No. 26. - Mr William Cambridge, Market Lavington, Devizes, Wiltshire 3.5 horse power portable steam engine with shafts complete for traveling.”

¹⁶ For example, a listing from 1853 reads: “William Ball, of Rothwell, Northamptonshire, for his plough best adapted for deep ploughing. Seven Sovereigns.”

¹⁷ For example, part of one schedule reads: “For the best portable or fixed steam engine, applicable to thrashing and other agricultural purposes. Fifty Sovereigns. For the best drain plough, to cut at one, two, or three cuts, to the greatest depth, with not more than four horses, so as to prepare a drain so far for deeper cutting. Twenty five Sovereigns.”

¹⁸ For example, Robert Aglionby Slaney Esq., Member of Parliament, announced through the RASE in 1850 the offer of two prizes of 10 sovereigns each for drain ploughs.

¹⁹ The schedule of prizes announced is missing for the years 1845, 1851 (due to the Crystal Palace Exhibition), 1854, 1857, 1862, 1925, and 1939.

grouped the inventions that were exhibited and entered into competitions into twelve technology categories. These are described in Appendix two.

Descriptive evidence highlights key aspects of the competitions. The shows were organized by the RASE in a different national location each year. Shows were held in a mixture of rural and urban districts because trials could be more easily set up in rural locations, whereas manufacturing districts attracted larger numbers of visitors and were generally more profitable. The first show in 1839 was held in Oxford because of its central location in the country and subsequent shows were held in places easily accessible by railway for the benefit of visitors and exhibitors. Once a particular district had been announced by the RASE as the location for a show, towns within that district competed with one another for the official nomination (Goddard, 1988, p. 33). The RASE returned to some towns multiple times between 1839 and 1939, such as the six shows held in Newcastle Upon Tyne in the years 1846, 1864, 1887, 1908, 1923 and 1935.

Figure 1 illustrates that prize winners and the shows were geographically dispersed. British nationals constituted 98 percent of the prize winners, although the prize schedule was announced also in foreign countries through publications such as the *Scientific American* (see, for example, 5th May 1894, p. 277). Foreign entrants were more common in later years, when the real cost of transport was much lower.²⁰ Within Britain, there was no local bias in the awarding of prizes.²¹ The average winner lived 114 miles from the show at which they won their award and just 1.5 percent of the winners were co-located with the awarding show. Although each show was smaller than the Great Exhibition, which attracted 6 million visitors (Moser, 2005, p.1224), even the smallest show at Park Royal in London in 1905 attracted almost 24,000 visitors, while the median number of attendees at the shows on which we have data was 100,000. The size of the shows meant around 400,000 implements were exhibited in total, with about 2-3 percent of these being considered sufficiently technologically important to be entered into the prize contests.

Summary statistics on the prizes are given in Table 1. Of particular note is the fact that the value of the monetary prizes on offer was more than the value actually awarded. Judges conferred a prize only if the scientific criteria for winning were met. This sparked further interest by the participants and elevated the reputation of the awards. The monetary prizes, although substantial, certainly did not fully cover the average costs of development. To illustrate this, we

²⁰ Three out of thirteen gold medals were awarded to foreigners – two to McCormick for their reapers and one to the Swede Knut Ivar Lindstrom for his dairy machine.

²¹ The shows moved regularly and the judges were chosen by the RASE independently of geography.

collected the RASE's estimate of the price for which the exhibited implement would be offered for sale, which is available in the catalogues for 662 award winners. Figure 2 plots the prize awards against the sale prices of the winning implements, revealing a slope coefficient of 0.34. Although measurement error in the RASE price estimates will bias the coefficient downwards, the fact that the prize value was significantly less than the value of the exhibit is supported by records from the shows. A report of the stewards of implements for 1848 states that, "the implement makers are unanimous in declaring that, even when successful, the prizes they receive do not reimburse them for their expenses and loss of time" (Jenkins, 1878, p.870).²²

Interestingly, entrants were also attracted to purely non-pecuniary prize competitions by the offer of medals. Part of the payoff to entrants came in the form of free advertising that entry (and particularly winning) conferred on the invention. The most prestigious award was the RASE's gold medal, which was used selectively. Six of the 16 gold medals announced in our prize schedule data were for harvesting machinery, an area in which productivity differences between British and American agriculture were especially pronounced (David, 1971). Figure 3 shows the impact of these gold medal announcements on the number of competition entries. There was an especially large spike coinciding with the first medal, offered for "the best system for drying corn and hay in wet weather". As with monetary awards, the RASE awarded fewer gold medals than it announced (Table 1). The reverse was true for silver medals, with 205 announced in the schedule but 498 awarded, the additional ones being through *ex post* prizes to contestants. Bronze medals were announced in the RASE prize schedule but never actually awarded. Over time, with growing constraints on the financial resources of the RASE, medal awards became more common than monetary awards. This trend is illustrated in Figure 4.²³

3.2 Patents and Renewal Fees

Since a key objective of our analysis is to determine whether prizes induce innovation, we collected patent data.²⁴ While patents have their limitations, they are a well-documented output measure of innovation (Griliches, 1990). They are especially useful when the raw patent counts

²² At the mid-point of our study (1890) the mean prize of £50 would be worth around £4,000 at today's prices; and one of the top prizes of £500 (awarded in 1858) would be worth £37,000.

²³ The largest number of prize contests occurred in the early years, peaking at 28 in 1850. The RASE scaled back in later years to conserve its budget. There were approximately 5-10 awards on offer each year from 1870 to 1939.

²⁴ Beyond patenting, we also cross tabulated our dataset of inventions against Schmookler's (1966, pp. 282-293) list of important mechanical inventions in agriculture. We found that almost two-thirds (63 percent) of Schmookler's inventions were entered for prizes, suggesting that the quality of entrant inventions was high.

can be quality adjusted, as we do with our data using the renewal fees discussed below. We assembled patents for the period 1839 to 1939 from two existing databases. The first is “A Cradle of Inventions” (hereafter COI), which contains all British patent *applications* from 1617 to 1893. The second is the European Patent Office Database (hereafter EPO), which contains British patents *granted* from 1894 to the present.²⁵

The COI dataset is a composite of various British Patent Office records. Bennet Woodcroft, the celebrated first Superintendent of Patent Specifications and Indexes and later Clerk to the Commissioners, put together and published lists of all patentees and their inventions from March 1617 to October 1852. Woodcroft worked with the “fine” copies of granted patents stored in the various Chancery Rolls and other old records of government. The compilers of COI then appended to this data all patent applications from 1852 to 1893, but for these years they did not distinguish between patent applications and patent grants. We therefore hand entered from the various journals of the British Patent Office over 170,000 patents that were granted between 1852 and 1893 in order to make the dataset consistent for our purposes. The net result is a data set of over 900,000 British patents that were granted between 1839 and 1939. Our series is presented in Figure 5. This shows the large effect of the 1883 Act, which reduced the costs of obtaining a patent, as well as the large dip in patenting during the First World War.

We next proceeded to check the inventions of our entrants and prize winners against the COI and EPO data in order to determine whether the technologies exhibited were patented. An advantage of the British patent system is that innovations keep their application number throughout their life cycle. When an application is granted, perhaps 6 to 12 months after filing, that same number is referenced and the number is referenced again when renewal fees are paid, or when the patent lapses. Observing patents from their filing point is especially useful for our purposes because we are interested in the timing of the patent with respect to the invention being exhibited at a show. We matched by hand the names of inventors and the titles of their inventions in the RASE dataset and the dataset of patents. This allowed us to establish matches such as:

Thomas Huckvale, of Over-Norton, Oxfordshire, for his horse-hoe with revolving blades for thinning turnips [from the prize winning announcement at the 1841 show in Liverpool]

²⁵ Where entries were missing, we hand entered the data from original records of the British Patent Office.

and,

Thomas Huckvale, Horse hoes, and apparatus for treating and dressing turnips, to preserve them from insects [title of patent, September, 20th 1841]

Huckvale applied for a patent, which was subsequently granted, in September 1841 – the same year as the show at which he won his award. In the case of Thomas Huckvale, the matching is straightforward because the patenting year and the exhibition year are the same. But our search was conducted independently of the show date, so we are not limited to cases such as this.

Table 1 presents data on the patenting activity of winners and entrants. We find that 22 percent of prize winners and 17 percent of entrants who did not win prizes successfully patented the invention that they exhibited. The patenting share for prize winners jumps to 28 percent when we add observations that we could not match ourselves but for which a mention of patenting was made in the prize award records.²⁶ Figure 6 plots the time series for our conservative estimates, with vertical lines reflecting major changes in the patent laws.²⁷ Changes in the cost of obtaining a patent after 1883 had a large positive effect on aggregate patenting (Figure 5), but a smaller effect in Figure 6, which may be related to the 1880s agricultural depression.

Since our econometric exercise requires an output measure of innovation in the areas in which prizes were awarded, we took the additional step of matching our patent data to the technology categories that we describe in Appendix two. Rather than relying on an imperfect concordance between our categories and the subject classes of the British Patent Office, we followed the more direct approach of Bennet Woodcroft. In his compilation of a subject matter index of patents from 1617 to 1852, Woodcroft used keywords from the title of patents for allocation purposes. We perform the same exercise for all of our patents using keywords and Boolean operators organizing 130 sub-categories into 12 main technology categories. A more detailed discussion of our methodology is presented in Appendix three.

Finally, we compiled data on the quality of inventions using renewal fees. Renewal fees were charged by the British Patent Office to keep the patent term open. Schankerman and Pakes

²⁶ Sometimes the entries in the RASE prize award records specify that the invention was “patented”. However, this could mean that an application was simply in process. Given that we are unsure whether these patents were subsequently granted, we prefer not to use this incomplete information and instead use our measure that cross references inventor exhibits with our patent database. Furthermore, relying on this measure would introduce a selection bias in the propensity to patent because such data are not available for all non-winners.

²⁷ In 1852 the cost of a patent excluding expenses was reduced from £100 with no renewal fees to £25 with £150 in renewal fees over the life of the patent. In 1883 the application fee was reduced to £4. (Van Dulken, 1999, p. 24).

(1986, p.1052) point out that “if it is assumed that agents make renewal decisions based on the value of the patent right obtained by renewal, then data on patent renewals and renewal fee schedules contain information on the distribution of the value of patent rights”. Macleod, *et al.* (2003) argue that because credit-constrained inventors would not pay the renewal fees “the rates of renewal of patents in the nineteenth century almost certainly under-represent both the value of patent rights and the economic significance of invention” (p.561). On the other hand, because markets for invention existed in Britain at this time (Nicholas, 2010), as they also did in the United States in the late nineteenth century (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1999) and indeed in the modern era (Serrano, 2010), inventors could have secured external funds for the payment of renewal fees, or sold their patent rights. We believe examining renewed patents enhances the signal-to-noise ratio analogously to the use of patent citations (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2005). In order to negate the effect of patent law changes, we restricted our data collection to the period between the 1852 and 1883 Patent Acts, during which the renewal fees remained constant. We identified 20,542 patents granted from 1853 to 1880 that paid a £50 renewal fee due by the end of the third year of the patent life.²⁸ Between 26 and 33 percent of patents were renewed during this time (Figure 7).

4. Main Empirical Specifications

We address two main issues in our empirics. First, we examine the number of entrants into each of the award categories in order to determine how competitive the contests were. Second, we examine the pattern of patenting and patent renewals within technology categories and through time in order to determine the effect of prize awards on innovation.

4.1 Entrant Equation

Our main entrant estimating equation is specified below. Given that the variable for entrants takes on nonnegative integer count values and there is evidence of over-dispersion in the data, we use negative binomial regressions predicting entrants in technology category j at time t , conditional on the awards. Our main variables are the sum of monetary prizes (in constant sterling pounds using the CPI) and medals announced at time $t-1$ for categories $j=1, \dots, 12$ and

²⁸ We restrict the analysis to those patents that paid the first renewal fee. A second fee of £100 was due at year seven, but using this information would have restricted our sample too severely. Since the first fee was due at the end of year three of the patent life, and the new Act came into force in 1883, our data collection stopped in 1880.

time periods $t=1839, \dots, 1939$. We estimate entrant regressions for the whole sample period from 1839 to 1939 and for sub-periods, including the years when the RASE prize rotation system operated. We also use additional specifications with counts of monetary and medal awards to separate out the effect of the average monetary prize announced in a technology category from the number and to identify the effect of gold and silver medal awards. We include technology category (c_j) and year (τ_t) fixed effects and linear and quadratic technology category time trends to control for unobserved entry propensities that are correlated with the prizes. Identification comes from within technology category changes in entry over time:

$$ENTRANTS_{jt} = \beta_1 MONEY_{jt-1} + \beta_2 MEDALS_{jt-1} + c_j + \tau_t + (c_j \times t) + (c_j \times t^2) + \varepsilon_{jt}$$

4.2 Innovation Equation

Estimates of the entrant equation are informative because they provide an insight into the attractiveness of the prizes. According to the theory of tournaments (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), the prize system should have increased the average level of effort and performance by inventors, because awards were structured so that the largest prizes were awarded to the best inventions within each category. The variation of prize awards by priority areas suggests also that the RASE may have been able to influence aggregate innovation as well as entry. Testing for this possibility using the patent and renewal data requires an understanding of the propensity to patent and the timing of inventions. Our identification strategy requires that inventors used the patent system and that they responded to the prize incentives offered by the RASE.²⁹

In terms of the propensity to patent, Table 1 shows that only around one-sixth of the innovations entered into the RASE competitions were patented (2,682 patents out of 15,032 entries), but note that the total number of patents (i.e., those registered by RASE entrants and all other members of the public) in the technology categories that we use in our regressions was only 40,944. Therefore, the decision of RASE entrants to patent should be detectable in our dataset of all patents, especially if inventors active in the agricultural sector responded to the signal of the prizes, even though they may not have travelled to and entered the competitions.

²⁹ Since we are observing patenting within a single industry, our estimates are less likely to be confounded by the industry-specific patent disclosure trade-offs noted by Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) and Moser (2007).

As for timing, even significant innovations had relatively short gestation periods. For example, Cyrus McCormick only started to improve on his father’s reaper design at the start of the 1831 harvest but by the end of it he had an operational machine. His first patent was granted on June 21st, 1834. Moreover, the RASE frequently offered prizes for cumulative improvements on innovations, which could have feasibly been developed in time for the competitions.³⁰

An examination of the timing of patents for entrants is reported in Figure 8. For each prize entry that was patented, we plot the distribution of patenting years by their application date relative to the year in which the invention was exhibited. Patents are clearly clustered around the year in which the innovation was entered for a prize at the annual RASE show, although the distribution is less concentrated temporally for winners than non-winners.³¹ Importantly, for our purposes, the data for both winner patents and non-winner patents exhibit peaks in the year of the show in which they competed. Thus, 29 percent of non-winning entrant inventions and 16 percent of winning entrant inventions were patented with application dates at time $t=0$. It is this spike that allows us to isolate an effect of prizes on overall contemporaneous patenting.³²

Our main patent equation is structured according to the negative binomial entrant regression specified above. The dependent variable is a count of granted patents in technology category j at time t (i.e., the show year), or for the period 1853 to 1880, a count of patents in category j at time t where inventors later paid the first renewal fee of £50 at time $t+3$. The mean count varies according to the pecuniary and non-pecuniary awards announced in the prize schedule at time $t-1$. We provide estimates for the period 1839 to 1939, as well as sub-periods between major patent laws and the period of rotating prizes. Again we use technology category and year fixed effects and linear and quadratic technology category time trends. Our patent regression is:

$$PATENTS_{jt} = \gamma_1 MONEY_{jt-1} + \gamma_2 MEDALS_{jt-1} + c_j + \tau_t + (c_j \times t) + (c_j \times t^2) + \varepsilon_{jt}$$

³⁰ For example, the prize schedule for a gold medal award in 1876 reads: “Gold medal of the Society to be awarded for an efficient sheaf binding machine attached to a reaper or otherwise.” Reapers were used for harvesting grain crops, but collecting the sheaves and binding them was labor intensive.

³¹ We would expect to see a larger increase in post-show patenting by winners if a prize signaled that an invention were of high quality, since it would be more worthwhile to protect the value of the intellectual property right. As shown in Figure 8, we would also expect to see pre-show patenting if inventors preemptively patented given the lead times for the prize competitions, or if they were improving existing patented inventions in preparation for the shows.

³² The linkage, by timing, between patenting and RASE prizes is further described in Appendix one.

5. Main Results

5.1 Entrants

In Table 2 we report our estimates of the entrant equation. Panel A runs the regressions using the whole sample from 1839 to 1939, Panel B restricts the time period to be between major patent laws in order to provide estimates that can be compared to the patent and patent renewal specifications in Tables 3 and 4. Panel C restricts the regressions to the years between 1856 and 1872, when the RASE's triennial system of prize rotations operated.

Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A, Table 2 reveal the effects of monetary and medal awards on entrant counts. Since the monetary awards are logarithmically transformed, the estimates for this variable have an elasticity interpretation. The parameters are statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better. A doubling of monetary prizes equates to an 11 percent increase in entrant counts and each additional medal announced in the prize schedule increases the expected entrant count by $[\exp(\beta)-1]\times 100 = 12$ percent. In column 3, the coefficients on monetary and medal prizes remain stable when both variables are added simultaneously, which suggests that pecuniary and non-pecuniary inducements had additive effects on entrants. The estimates in column 3 show evidence of large effects by the prestige of the medal. Mean entrant counts increase by 53 percent for an additional gold medal announced in the prize schedule and by 9 percent for an additional silver medal. The large economically and statistically significant gold medal effect is consistent with the descriptive evidence in Figure 6, illustrating the boost to entrants in the harvesting machinery technology category in gold medal show years.

Columns 5 to 8 provide robustness checks on the main results. In columns 5 and 6, we add a lagged variable for the total number of entrants into the prize competitions. To the extent that the RASE partly funded the prizes from entrant fees, the amount of prizes offered, and thereby entrants, could be determined endogenously by a "budget size" effect. We find that a count of total entrants in the previous year has a strong positive effect on entrants by technology category in the current year, but the size and statistical significance of our monetary and medal coefficients remain robust. One interpretation of the results is that an award *per se* mattered as opposed to its pecuniary value, especially given that in expectation the monetary prizes represented only around one-third of the projected sale price of inventions (Figure 2). In columns 7 and 8, we specify the monetary prizes as variables measuring both the average monetary amount and the number of monetary prizes offered in the schedule. A doubling of the average

monetary amount equates to an 11.5 percent increase in entrants, but a doubling in the number of awards induces a much larger 26 percent increase. One explanation for these findings is that the prizes were attractive irrespective of their monetary value. They provided a “seal of quality” for inventors who could then advertise this to potential buyers, as opposed to directly compensating inventors for the costs of research and development.

Panel B changes the time period for which the regressions are estimated. Between 1853 and 1880, when 48 percent of the total monetary value of awards and 19 percent of all medals between 1839 and 1939 were announced, we estimate a larger coefficient on total money prizes in column 1, but the medal coefficient is much smaller and becomes statistically insignificant. However, the coefficient on the gold medal variable retains its statistical significance and economic magnitude. In column 4, an additional gold medal increases the expected number of entrants by 64 percent. In columns 5 and 6 we add variable measuring a count of total entrants and the number of attendees³³ in the previous year because the budget size effect described above may be a function of both entrant fees and ticket sale receipts. The total monetary and gold medal coefficients are robust to these controls. Finally, we find similar evidence to the results in Panel A on the average monetary and number of monetary variables. A doubling of the average monetary amount implies a 23 percent increase in expected entrants, whereas a doubling in the number of awards induces a 31 percent increase.

Panel C replicates the regressions for the period when the RASE used its triennial system of rotating prizes. The elasticity of entrants with respect to the value of monetary awards in column 1 is 0.17, which is similar in size to the estimate in column 1 of Panel B. Of particular interest is the effect of a gold medal on the entrant count, which increases to 144 percent in column 4, which is likely driven by the prize rotation system providing greater predictability over future prize offerings and therefore giving inventors longer lead times. The large and economically significant effect of the monetary and gold medal prizes holds in columns 5 and 6 with the addition of the lagged total entrant and attendance variables. In columns 8, both the average and number of monetary prizes are also statistically significant and the coefficient on the number variable is again larger than the coefficient on the average value. Overall, the results suggest that the prizes induced competitive entry. We next turn to our patent and renewal fee estimates to test for aggregate output effects on the level of innovation.

³³ Attendance statistics are only available from 1853.

5.1 Patents and Patent Renewals

Table 3 reports results of specifications with a count of patents in technology category j during the year of the show as the dependent variable. Because the prize variables are measured at time $t-1$, we are testing for an immediate effect of the prize awards on patenting activity. We use the same time periods as our entrant regressions: the full period (1839 to 1939); the period between major patent laws (1853 to 1880), when the cost of acquiring a patent remained constant; and the prize rotation period (1856 to 1872), when both the cost of acquiring a patent remained constant *and* prizes in the schedule were set according to the strict triennial system.

A first point to note from Panels A and B of Table 3 is the statistical insignificance of the prize variables. Both the elasticity of patenting with respect to money prizes and the marginal effect of a medal on patent counts are not distinguishable from zero at the customary levels. The coefficients on the gold and silver medals are imprecisely estimated (columns 3 and 4), as are those on the average, and number, of monetary prizes (columns 5 and 6). Panel C provides stronger evidence of a link between the prizes and patents during the rotation period. In column 1, the logarithm of total monetary prizes enters positively and significantly, although the elasticity is economically small. The effect of medals on patents is economically larger in column 2, with an additional medal implying an 8 percent increase in patents and a gold medal a 16 percent increase in patents based on the estimates in column 4. The coefficients on the average, and number, of monetary awards are positive and of a similar size in columns 5 and 6. As in column 1, the economic magnitude of the coefficient on the total monetary variable is small, with elasticity estimates around 0.02.

Going beyond the results based on raw patent counts, in Table 4 we control for the quality of patented inventions using only counts of patents that were renewed by the British Patent Office. Recall that these are patents for which an inventor would have needed to pay a £50 renewal fee due by the end of the third year to keep the patent in force. In Panel A, all the coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero for the period 1853 to 1880, but several clear the customary thresholds for statistical significance in Panel B when we exploit rotating prizes for the show years between 1856 and 1872. For these years, we assume that prize cycles would have been independent of invention cycles, so the effect of the prizes on patents is less likely to be confounded by supply or demand shocks in “hot” technology areas. The strongest statistically and economically significant effects of the prizes are those estimated in relation to

variables measuring medals. In column 2, we find that an additional medal equates to an 18 percent increase in renewed patents. In column 4, an additional gold medal implies a 23 percent increase. These results suggest that non-pecuniary prizes in the RASE schedule were particularly effective in generating innovation in the target areas.

6. Testing for Displacement Effects

One interpretation of the entrant and patent results is that the prizes encouraged competitive entry and innovation. But an important issue is the extent to which the prizes induced an increase in aggregate innovation or simply a reallocation of inventive effort from non-prize areas to prize areas. If inventors switched technology categories as a consequence of the prizes, then the effect we have identified so far may be coming from the displacement of inventions that would have occurred in other categories. Substitution of effort across technologies may have been particularly strong in the prize rotation period when inventors were given longer lead times. In order to test for the re-direction of existing inventive activity we examine patterns of substitution by inventors who we observe repeatedly. We then use these findings to check the robustness of our patent renewal regression results in Table 4.

Table 5 presents descriptive statistics on repeat entrants and inventors patenting agricultural inventions in our data. Of the 705 individuals who entered the RASE competitions between 1856 and 1872, we find that 454 entered into competition at least twice and of these 95 switched from the technology category in which we first observe them entering. Among all entrants, the rate of switching is high for prize winners relative to non-winners, which might be expected if prize winners were more capable inventors. Of repeat entrants who also won a prize, we observe 47 percent switching technology categories, compared to 15 percent of entrants who did not win a prize. We also generate the same statistics for inventors we observe patenting regardless of whether we also observe these individuals entering RASE prize competitions. We find that 67 percent of entrants who patented switched from the technology category we first observe them patenting in compared to 50 percent of inventors who did not enter RASE competitions.

Placing more quantitative structure on the data, we estimate the following conditional fixed effects logistic regressions. We define a dependent variable coded 1 for a switch of technology category by an entrant or inventor patenting at time t and 0 if the technology category remained the same. Some individuals switched more than once over the period, in which case we classify a

switch as 1 if it occurred in a different technology category from the first observed category and 0 otherwise. Our independent variables are monetary and medal prizes announced in the schedule at time $t-1$. With individual fixed effects (ϕ_i) we are identifying off within entrant/inventor variation in switching propensities.

$$SWITCH_{ijt} = \gamma_1 MONEY_{jt-1} + \gamma_2 MEDALS_{jt-1} + \phi_i + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

Table 6 presents coefficients converted to odds ratios for all entrants, as well as entrants disaggregated into prize winners and non-winners. Although all the estimates are statistically insignificant according to the value of the z-statistics, some of the results are economically important. In columns 1, 2 and 4 of Panels A, B and C, the odds ratios equal, or are close to, unity with respect to medal and monetary prizes, so these variables have no impact on the odds of an entrant, prize winner or non-winner switching their technology category. But in column 2, the odds of observing an entrant at time t who had switched from their first technology category are 50 percent higher for a gold medal announcement at time $t-1$, 34 percent higher for prize winners and 76 percent higher for non-winners. In other words, we find switching by entrants in RASE prize competitions to be economically meaningfully related to prestigious non-pecuniary awards, which also happen to have the largest effect in our patent results in Table 4.

Table 7 runs the same specifications for all inventors patenting (Panel A) and the subsets of inventors who patented and entered (Panel B), or did not enter (Panel C), into the prize competitions. Here the results provide us with a way of controlling for the possible effect of technology category switching in the patent renewal regressions. Note that in Panel A, the odds ratios on the prizes variables are economically close to unity, implying that the prizes had no impact on the odds of switching, but the odds are higher with respect to medal awards for entrants (Panel B) relative to non-entrants (Panel C). Because both sets of inventors contribute to the patent renewals that we use in the regressions in Table 4, if we assume that *all* non-entrants who also patented in agricultural related areas were less likely to switch, then this group provides one way of purging our results of switching biases.

In Table 8 we run the specifications in Panel B of Table 4, using a dependent variable with counts of renewed patents by non-entrants only. We find that the coefficient on medals in column 2 of Table 8 is not statistically significant, unlike the comparable coefficient in column 2, Panel B of Table 4, but it is of a similar economic magnitude. Moreover, the effect of a gold

medal is much larger ($[\exp(0.307)-1]\times 100 = 36$ percent versus $[\exp(0.203)-1]\times 100 = 23$ percent in column 4, Panel B of Table 4). These results imply a positive effect of the prizes on patenting that is plausibly independent of technology category switching. Taking the results in Tables 5 to 8 together, suggests that only part of the boost in patenting we observe in our main results could potentially be explained by inventors switching into technology categories for which a prize was being offered. Our evidence therefore indicates that inducement prizes had an economically important effect on aggregate innovative activity.

7. Conclusion

We have examined one of the longest available datasets of awards for innovation to determine the extent to which these prizes spurred technological development. We find that prizes induced competitive entry and that the largest effects are for prestigious medals. Consistent with competitive entry, we find important output effects of the prizes based on counts of quality-adjusted patents, which can only be partly explained by technology category substitution. Our quantitative evidence on the utility of prizes is supported qualitatively. The *Scientific American* remarked of the RASE prize system in 1867: “It is indisputable that these competitive trials have done, and are doing, much to raise agricultural engineering to the highest standards of efficiency and economy.” With respect to steam engines, which had the largest impact on productivity growth of any technology in the mid-to-late nineteenth century (Crafts, 2004), the role of the RASE was again noted by the *Scientific American* in 1874: “An investigation of the results obtained from year to year shows a most extraordinary improvement in the engines, as regards economy and workmanship, and there is little doubt that the effect of these tests has been most beneficial to the users of steam power.” An 1864 report by the Society of Arts noted: “Without the prize system the manufacturers would not have been guided to the production of the class of implements really required.”

Equally, we are aware of caveats to our findings. An alternative interpretation for the success of prizes we identify is that they signaled to inventors potentially fruitful areas of innovation. That is, areas where the quality of existing machinery was low, improvement was feasible, and latent market demand was high. Our empirical analysis does not enable us to distinguish between this signaling story and the prize value story. All we can say in this paper is that prizes were effective in generating innovation in the areas targeted by the RASE awards.

Furthermore, we cannot determine how much of the boost to patents we observe is driven by shifts in the propensity to patent as inventors sought to avoid expropriation risk as a consequence of the RASE offering prizes and attracting inventors to the technology target areas. This effect would upward bias our results. At the same time, the output effects that we observe may be downward biased, because we do not observe unpatented inventions that may also have been stimulated by the prizes or patents occurring in years other than the show year that we use for identification purposes. Moreover, if prize-induced patented or unpatented inventions generated sequences of cumulative innovations, then the downward bias will be large.

Our historical evidence on RASE prizes offers guidance for the design of current inducement prize contests. Mega prizes, such as those offered by the X-Prize Foundation, presuppose that inventors are incentivized by large pecuniary inducements, but R&D costs typically exceed the value of the prize. For example, 26 teams competed for the X-Prize for suborbital spaceflight and collectively spent in excess of \$100 million for a ten million dollar prize. Our evidence suggests that non-pecuniary prizes can be particularly effective. They avoid the complex process of linking the magnitude of the prize to the value of a particular technology and inventors are still able to appropriate by winning. The RASE contests offered free publicity and public approbation. Inventors could benefit from the seal of quality ascribed to the invention when selling or licensing their technologies. The RASE lowered administrative costs by using medals rather than financial awards. The evidence also indicates that the prizes could be used as a tool to change the direction of inventive activity, which has particular relevance for prizes in areas such as climate and environmental protection.

One explanation for why the financial awards to inventors were relatively small (around one-third of the sale value of an invention according to Figure 2) is that the RASE prizes were complementary to patents. Intellectual property rights provided incentives for inventors to invest in useful knowledge because they could appropriate through proprietary pricing, which was augmented by the effects of the prizes. Although this means that the prizes may have magnified deadweight losses, they also realized benefits that the patent system could not. Prizes facilitated the diffusion of technical information further than the disclosures required by patenting. They also influenced the direction of technological change by shifting the areas in which inventors engaged in search for new ideas. Notwithstanding the RASE prizes may have concentrated inventive effort in agricultural versus non-agricultural areas, thereby impeding the movement of

resources out of agriculture and into industry, our evidence suggests that in agricultural technologies, the prizes encouraged innovation beyond the patent system alone.

Given the imperfections associated with patents, the literature on innovation incentives has attempted to evaluate the use of alternative, or complementary, mechanisms such as prizes. The theoretical literature is well-developed in this area, but empirical work has been lacking. This is particularly problematic because uncertainty about the cost-benefit tradeoff associated with prizes acts as a major barrier to changing innovation promoting policies (Kremer, 1998, pp. 1162-1165; NRC, 2007). Insofar as policy changes require supporting empirical evidence, our findings suggest that inducement prizes for innovation can work.

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Appendix two. We organized our entrant and prize winner data into the following technology categories, where we have 12 main categories codifying 130 sub-categories. Each sub-category reflects a technology area we identified in the description of an entrant or prize winner invention.

Table A2. Technology categories.

MAIN CATEGORY	SUB-CATEGORY	MAIN CATEGORY	SUB-CATEGORY
Planting Machinery	dibbling machine	Dairy	international dairy
	drill, also seed sowers		working dairy
Miscellaneous Implements	drill presser	milking machine	
	hand seed-dibble	milk-tester	
Cultivating Implements	hand-barrow drill	dairies suitable for butter and cheese	
	horse seed dibbler	dairy implements and machinery	
Miscellaneous Implements	miscellaneous implements	cream separator	
		butter makers	
Cultivating Implements	powder sprayers	butter packages, also egg packages	
	scarifiers or grubbers	butter machinery	
Cultivating Implements	liquid manure distributor	butter-drying machine	
	manure distributor	cheese-presser	
Cultivating Implements	horse hoe	churn	
	cultivator		
Cultivating Implements	cultivator, clod-crushers, rollers	Miscellaneous	
	digging machine	miscellaneous	
Cultivating Implements	spraying machine		
	harrows	Plough	
Cultivating Implements	top dresser	horse plough	
	couch rake	subsoilers	
Cultivating Implements		subsoil pulverizer	
Harvesting Machinery	mowers and reapers	Other	
	potato diggers & sorters	agricultural machinery	
Harvesting Machinery	root lifter, also thinner	combined guard & feeder	
	sheaf-binding machine	corpolite mills	
Harvesting Machinery	side delivery rakes	cottage grates or stoves	
	horse (or tractor) rake	cottage range	
Harvesting Machinery	swath turners	bricks drain-tile or pipe-machine	
	hay maker	draining tool	
Harvesting Machinery	grass mowers	dynamometer	
		field gates, fencing, folds, latches, pens	
Grain Processing Machines	threshing/thrashing machine	fire engine	
	winnowing machine	hand pulling machine	
Grain Processing Machines	straw trussers, also tedders, binders & presses	harness	
	barley hummellers	horse engines and machinery	
Grain Processing Machines	chaff cutter	horse gear also pony gears	
	hand corn mill	machinery in motion	
Grain Processing Machines	grinding mill	model of rick-yard	
	grist mills	movable huts	
Grain Processing Machines	hand-dressing machine	plans & models, also samples, specimens	
	hand-power machine	poultry production	
Grain Processing Machines	finishing machine	seed drawers	
	straw elevator with horse power	seeds	
Grain Processing Machines	straw elevators with a threshing machine	sheep dipping apparatus	
	corn cleaner	sheep shearing machine	
Grain Processing Machines	corn or flour dressing machine	thatch-making machine	
	corn screen	weighing machine	
Grain Processing Machines	corn and cake crusher or bruiser	washing machines, mangles, wringers	
	combined portable threshing & finishing	pumps	
Grain Processing Machines	combined stacking machine	sack hoists, holders, lifters, barrows	
		stone breakers, rock drills, stone mills	
Non-Grain Processing Machines	paring & coring machine	grindstone stuff	
	mills		
Non-Grain Processing Machines	root pulper	Engines	
	root steamer	light portable motors	
Non-Grain Processing Machines	linseed crusher	water-lifting engine	
	meal mill	steam-engines	
Non-Grain Processing Machines	cider-making plant	simple portable agricultural engine	
	root cutters	fixed steam engines	
Non-Grain Processing Machines	cake bruisers	compound portable agricultural engine	
	cake breaker	steam cultivation	
Non-Grain Processing Machines	cake crusher	steam plough	
	oil-cake breaker	traction engines	
Non-Grain Processing Machines	crushers	engines, boilers	
	gorse crusher		
Non-Grain Processing Machines	gorse-bruise	Transport	
	disintegrators	waggon, bikes, wheels, tractors, barrows	
Non-Grain Processing Machines	bone mills	whippetrees	
	drum guard		
Non-Grain Processing Machines	flax breaking machine		
	fruit and vegetable evaporator		
Non-Grain Processing Machines	fruit-package		
	steaming apparatus		
Non-Grain Processing Machines	hop machinery		
	hop-washing machine		

Appendix three. We used the technology categories specified in Appendix two to establish a set of keywords, which we subsequently used to identify patents granted in these areas between 1839 and 1939. While patents were organized by the Patent Office according to a classification system, we were unable to develop a concordance because the classification changed over time and our technology categories are finely graded and overlap with the broader subject arrangements available.

Our method is based on Bennet Woodcroft's *Subject-Matter Index (Made from Titles Only) of Patents of Invention, 1617-1852* (British Patent Office, 1854). Thus we took our keywords and searched for matches in the titles of patents in our database. For example, to identify patents in the first sub-category in Table A1 for dibbling machines (machines used to get seed into the ground) we used the keywords "dibbling" "dibble" and "dibbles".


We report in Table A3 descriptive statistics on the patents we identified in each category that were used in our regression. We could not develop keywords for "Miscellaneous Implements" and "Miscellaneous" in Table A2 and these categories are also excluded from our regressions. In Figure A3 we show a comparison of the patent counts for our keyword method and those in the subject series published by the Patent Office. Our example is for the time period 1909-1913 when "Harvesting Appliances" happened to be specified in the classification of published complete specifications. We matched these data up to our main category of "Harvesting Machinery".

Table A3. Summary statistics.

Main Category (from Table A1)	Patents, 1839-1939	Patents, 1853-1880 Renewal Fee Paid
Planting Machinery	1.18 (1.85)	0.29 (0.49)
Cultivating Implements	70.70 (62.58)	8.91 (2.12)
Harvesting Machinery	28.02 (14.35)	6.67 (3.65)
Grain Processing Machines	53.43 (25.38)	14.20 (7.28)
Non-grain Processing Machines	40.45 (24.39)	12.14 (5.11)
Dairy	27.79 (21.69)	1.20 (1.30)
Plough	22.96 (26.14)	5.14 (1.95)
Other	297.23 (224.45)	44.73 (11.12)
Engines	506.80 (314.66)	83.92 (13.97)
Transport	145.38 (160.96)	9.29 (27.55)

Notes: Figures are the mean patent counts in each category in each year, with standard deviations in parentheses.

Figure A3. Comparing “Harvesting” patents identified using keywords with “Harvesting” patents in the subject classification.



Notes: Figures are patent counts identified by keyword for 1909-1913 for our category “Harvesting Machinery” and patent counts in the category “Harvesting Appliances” in the abridgements of patent specifications.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

	Mean	St. Dev	Min	Max	Total
Shows					
Duration of Show (days)	4.57	1.20	1	10	448
Attendance	105,083	43,140	23,978	217,980	8,826,955
Implement Stands	335	134	12	704	32,518
Implements Exhibited	4,294	2,140	54	11,878	364,975
Prize Contests					
Monetary Prizes Announced (£)	50.16	85.11	0	665	17,908
Monetary Prizes Awarded (£)	30.35	66.87	0	648	13,295
Medals Announced	0.63	0.94	0	10	224
Gold	0.04	0.21	0	1	16
Silver	0.57	0.90	0	10	205
Bronze	0.01	0.12	0	2	3
Medals Awarded	1.17	1.18	0	8	511
Gold	0.03	0.17	0	1	13
Silver	1.14	1.16	0	8	498
Bronze	0	0	0	0	0
Winning Inventions (n=1,986)					
Inventions Patented	0.22	0.41	0	1	432
Non-Winning Inventions (n=13,046)					
Inventions Patented	0.17	0.38	0	1	2,250

Notes: There were no shows in 1917 and 1918 due to the First World War and in 1866 due to cattle plague. Statistics for all shows other than: attendance where statistics are for shows 1853-1939; implements exhibited where statistics are from 1839-1927. Prize competitions statistics are for 91 shows where prizes were announced the year prior to the show and where data were available. The schedule of prizes announced is missing for years 1845, 1851 (due to the Crystal Palace Exhibition), 1854, 1857, 1862, 1925, and 1939. Monetary values expressed in constant prices using the CPI where 1871=100. We spliced the Rousseau price index (1830-45) onto the Sauerbeck price index (1846-1938); both series are taken from Mitchell and Deane (1962). As the series stops in 1938, we used the 1938 value of the index for 1939. Inventions patented are for all patent applications that were sealed (i.e., granted).

Table 2. Contest entrant regression results.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Panel A: Full Period, 1839-1939								
(log) Total Monetary _{<i>j,t-1</i>}	0.106*** [0.018]		0.105*** [0.018]		0.084*** [0.017]			
Medals _{<i>j,t-1</i>}		0.115** [0.045]	0.092*** [0.028]		0.110*** [0.033]			
Gold Medal _{<i>j,t-1</i>}				0.426** [0.194]		0.665*** [0.200]		
Silver Medal _{<i>j,t-1</i>}				0.083** [0.035]		0.076*** [0.028]		
(log) Entrants _{<i>t-1</i>}					0.539*** [0.053]	0.525*** [0.047]		
(log) Average Monetary _{<i>j,t-1</i>}							0.115*** [0.023]	
(log) Number Monetary _{<i>j,t-1</i>}								0.261*** [0.035]
Observations	983	983	983	983	897	897	983	983
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Technology Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel B: Period Between Major Patent Laws, 1853-1880								
(log) Total Monetary _{<i>j,t-1</i>}	0.162*** [0.026]		0.161*** [0.026]		0.146*** [0.024]			
Medals _{<i>j,t-1</i>}		0.041 [0.055]	0.011 [0.015]		0.005 [0.019]			
Gold Medal _{<i>j,t-1</i>}				0.495** [0.197]	0.000	0.591** [0.245]		
Silver Medal _{<i>j,t-1</i>}				-0.008 [0.027]		-0.020 [0.020]		
(log) Entrants _{<i>t-1</i>}					0.055 [0.111]	0.185** [0.090]		
(log) Attendance _{<i>t-1</i>}					0.010 [0.064]	0.044 [0.080]		
(log) Average Monetary _{<i>j,t-1</i>}							0.228*** [0.042]	
(log) Number Monetary _{<i>j,t-1</i>}								0.309*** [0.044]
Observations	297	297	297	297	273	273	297	297
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Technology Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel C: Prize Rotation Period, 1856-1876								
(log) Total Monetary _{<i>j,t-1</i>}	0.166*** [0.023]		0.166*** [0.023]		0.155*** [0.019]			
Medals _{<i>j,t-1</i>}		-0.001 [0.039]	0.000 [0.018]		0.005 [0.021]			
Gold Medal _{<i>j,t-1</i>}				0.894*** [0.188]		1.232*** [0.071]		
Silver Medal _{<i>j,t-1</i>}				-0.031 [0.034]		-0.025 [0.018]		
(log) Entrants _{<i>t-1</i>}				0.000	0.119 [0.116]	0.380*** [0.101]		
(log) Attendance _{<i>t-1</i>}					0.113 [0.139]	0.200 [0.200]		
(log) Average Monetary _{<i>j,t-1</i>}							0.233*** [0.040]	
(log) Number Monetary _{<i>j,t-1</i>}								0.321*** [0.038]
Observations	175	175	175	175	163	163	175	175
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Technology Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Negative binomial regression coefficients with a count of entrants in technology category j at time t as the dependent variable. The attendance variable is constructed from statistics reported by the RASE as number of visitors to each of the shows, which are available from 1853. All monetary amounts are deflated by the CPI. Robust standard errors in squared brackets are clustered by technology category. Significance is at the *** 1 percent ** 5 percent and * 10 percent levels.

Table 3. Patent regression results.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Panel A: Full Period, 1839-1939						
(log) Total Monetary _{jt-1}	0.001 [0.006]		0.001 [0.006]			
Medals _{jt-1}		0.015 [0.016]	0.014 [0.017]			
Gold Medal _{jt-1}				0.018 [0.109]		
Silver Medals _{jt-1}				0.019 [0.015]		
(log) Average Monetary _{jt-1}					0.003 [0.008]	
(log) Number Monetary _{jt-1}						-0.004 [0.011]
Observations	874	874	874	874	874	874
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Technology Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel B: Period Between Major Patent Laws, 1853-1880						
(log) Total Monetary _{jt-1}	-0.003 [0.007]		-0.003 [0.006]			
Medals _{jt-1}		-0.006 [0.054]	0.001 [0.047]			
Gold Medal _{jt-1}				-0.015 [0.041]		
Silver Medals _{jt-1}				0.003 [0.102]		
(log) Average Monetary _{jt-1}					-0.004 [0.010]	
(log) Number Monetary _{jt-1}						-0.007 [0.014]
Observations	269	269	269	269	269	269
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Technology Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel C: Prize Rotation Period, 1856-1872						
(log) Total Monetary _{jt-1}	0.011** [0.005]		0.010* [0.005]			
Medals _{jt-1}		0.077** [0.039]	0.058 [0.042]			
Gold Medal _{jt-1}				0.148** [0.058]		
Silver Medals _{jt-1}				0.039 [0.065]		
(log) Average Monetary _{jt-1}					0.017* [0.009]	
(log) Number Monetary _{jt-1}						0.020 [0.014]
Observations	159	159	159	159	159	159
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Technology Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Negative binomial regression coefficients with a count of patents in technology category j at time t as the dependent variable. All monetary amounts are deflated by the CPI. Robust standard errors in squared brackets are clustered by technology category. Significance is at the *** 1 percent ** 5 percent and * 10 percent levels.

Table 4. Patent renewal regression results.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Panel A: Between Patent Laws, 1853-1880						
(log) Total Monetary _{jt-1}	0.013 [0.011]		0.010 [0.010]			
Medals _{jt-1}		0.132 [0.103]	0.113 [0.095]			
Gold Medal _{jt-1}				0.090 [0.061]		
Silver Medals _{jt-1}				0.168 [0.158]		
(log) Average Monetary _{jt-1}					0.019 [0.017]	
(log) Number Monetary _{jt-1}						0.023 [0.024]
Observations	269	269	269	269	269	269
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Technology Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel B: Prize Rotation Period, 1856-1872						
(log) Total Monetary _{jt-1}	0.021 [0.015]		0.018 [0.015]			
Medals _{jt-1}		0.164** [0.081]	0.129 [0.079]			
Gold Medal _{jt-1}				0.203*** [0.077]		
Silver Medals _{jt-1}				0.144 [0.125]		
(log) Average Monetary _{jt-1}					0.034* [0.020]	
(log) Number Monetary _{jt-1}						0.031 [0.037]
Observations	159	159	159	159	159	159
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Technology Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Negative binomial regression coefficients with a count of renewed patents in technology category j at time t as the dependent variable. All monetary amounts are deflated by the CPI. Robust standard errors in squared brackets are clustered by technology category. Significance is at the *** 1 percent ** 5 percent and * 10 percent levels.

Table 5. Repeat entrants and inventors patenting, 1856-1872.

	Number		Repeat		Repeat and Switch	
	N	N	[% of col.1]	N	[% of col.2]	
Entrants	705	454	[64.4]	95	[20.9]	
Prize Winners	103	87	[84.5]	41	[47.1]	
Non-Winners	602	367	[61.0]	54	[14.7]	
Inventors Patenting	2,053	573	[27.9]	300	[52.4]	
Entrants	156	86	[55.1]	58	[67.4]	
Non-Entrants	1,897	487	[25.7]	242	[49.7]	

Notes: This table shows the number and percentage of repeat entrants into prize competitions and repeat inventors in the patent data whether they entered a prize competition or not. Switching is defined by whether the entering category or patenting category changes relative to the first time the entrant/inventor is observed in the data. All observations are for the prize rotation period, 1856-1872.

Table 6. Odds of switching by entrants, 1856-1872.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Panel A: Entrants				
(log) Total Monetary _{jt-1}	0.952			0.954
	[-1.42]			[-1.37]
Medals _{jt-1}		1.071		1.064
		[0.89]		[0.80]
Gold Medal _{jt-1}			1.500	
			[0.80]	
Silver Medals _{jt-1}			1.064	
			[0.79]	
Observations	659	659	659	659
Panel B: Prize Winners				
(log) Total Monetary _{jt-1}	0.933			0.934
	[-1.54]			[-1.51]
Medals _{jt-1}		1.066		1.057
		[0.62]		[0.54]
Gold Medal _{jt-1}			1.342	
			[0.44]	
Silver Medals _{jt-1}			1.060	
			[0.56]	
Observations	362	362	362	362
Panel C: Non-Winners				
(log) Total Monetary _{jt-1}	0.979			0.982
	[-0.40]			[-0.35]
Medals _{jt-1}		1.079		1.075
		[0.64]		[0.61]
Gold Medal _{jt-1}			1.761	
			[0.71]	
Silver Medals _{jt-1}			1.069	
			[0.56]	
Observations	297	297	297	297

Notes: Odds ratios from conditional fixed effects logits with switching as the dependant variable coded 1 if an entrant enters into a competition in a different technology category to that in which they are first observed and 0 if the category stays the same. Z-statistics in squared brackets. All monetary amounts are deflated by the CPI.

Table 7. Odds of switching by inventors patenting, 1856-1872.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Panel A: Inventors Patenting				
(log) Total Monetary _{jt-1}	0.972			0.971
	[-1.20]			[-1.23]
Medals _{jt-1}		1.015		1.063
		[0.08]		[0.31]
Gold Medal _{jt-1}			0.837	
			[-0.45]	
Silver Medals _{jt-1}			1.074	
			[0.33]	
Observations	1,228	1,228	1,228	1,228
Panel B: Inventors Patenting - Entrants				
(log) Total Monetary _{jt-1}	1.003			0.991
	[0.06]			[-0.15]
Medals _{jt-1}		1.551		1.570
		[1.06]		[1.07]
Gold Medal _{jt-1}			0.912	
			[-0.11]	
Silver Medals _{jt-1}			1.843	
			[1.28]	
Observations	237	237	237	237
Panel C: Inventors Patenting - Non-Entrants				
(log) Total Monetary _{jt-1}	0.966			0.967
	[-1.35]			[-1.28]
Medals _{jt-1}		0.896		0.945
		[-0.49]		[-0.25]
Gold Medal _{jt-1}			0.809	
			[-0.47]	
Silver Medals _{jt-1}			0.923	
			[-0.32]	
Observations	991	991	991	991

Notes: Odds ratios from conditional fixed effects logits with switching as the dependant variable coded 1 if an inventor patents in a different technology category to that in which they are first observed and 0 if the category stays the same. Z-statistics in squared brackets. All monetary amounts are deflated by the CPI.

Table 8. Robustness check on patent renewal regression results.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Prize Rotation Period, 1856-1872 (Dependent Variable: Renewed Patents by Non-Entrants)						
(log) Total Monetary _{jt-1}	0.022 [0.017]		0.019 [0.017]			
Medals _{jt-1}		0.146 [0.091]	0.112 [0.087]			
Gold Medal _{jt-1}				0.307*** [0.117]		
Silver Medals _{jt-1}				0.071 [0.145]		
(log) Average Monetary _{jt-1}					0.037* [0.022]	
(log) Number Monetary _{jt-1}						0.030 [0.042]
Observations	159	159	159	159	159	159
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Technology Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear and Quadratic Technology Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: These specifications replicate those in Panel B of Table 4, but only using patents renewed by non-entrants into the prize competitions. Negative binomial regression coefficients with a count of renewed patents in technology category j at time t as the dependent variable. All monetary amounts are deflated by the CPI. Robust standard errors in squared brackets are clustered by technology category. Significance is at the *** 1 percent ** 5 percent and * 10 percent levels.





Figure 1. The geographic distribution of shows and prize winners, 1839-1939.


Notes: Show locations are given by large black circles, and prize winner addresses by small red circles. Geo-coded data points are for 1,814 of our prize winners.

Figure 2. Regression plot of prizes awarded against the projected sale price of the winning invention.




Notes: Variables are specified in logs in a regression of $\ln Y$ on $\ln X$ with an estimated beta of 0.34 (s.e. 0.02). The projected sale price of the winning invention is obtained for 662 observations, as reported in the *Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society of England*.

Figure 3. Entrants for prizes announced in harvesting machinery.




Notes: Harvesting machinery category as specified in Appendix two. Solid circles represent gold medals in this prize contest category. They are for the show years 1869, 1875, 1876, 1877, 1878 and 1881.

Figure 4. Monetary and medal awards announced in the prize schedule.




Notes: Data are taken from the prize schedules announced in the year prior to the show. Monetary values expressed in constant sterling pounds using the CPI where 1871=100.

Figure 5. Patents granted by the British Patent Office, 1839-1939.




Notes: Our series of patents was compiled using the COI and EPO datasets as described in the text, as well as our own data collection from the patent journals of the British Patent Office.

Figure 6. Patenting rates.




Notes: Vertical lines are for major changes associated with the cost of obtaining a patent, namely 1852, 1883 and 1905 (Van Dulken, 1999, p. 24). Observations represent averages for each year for tabulations of inventions matched up to our database of granted patents.

Figure 7. Proportion of patents paying the first renewal fee, 1853-80.



Notes: Renewed patents are listed in the journals of the British Patent Office. Our data reflect all patents for which the first renewal fee of £50 was paid by the end of the third year of the patent's term.

Figure 8. Histograms illustrating the timing of patents for winners and non-winners of prize awards, 1839-1939.



Notes: Observations are calculated as patent application year minus the show year such that negative values reflect patents granted for inventions exhibited at the show that were applied for prior to the show and after the show for positive values.